journal of social history summer 2011 relationship to the past, more elective than imperative, open, flexible, alive, and continually being reworked." 7 French collective memory in general, therefore, appears to have become more fragmented, hence the use of the plural in the title of the third volume of Nora's collection: Les Lieux de mémoire: Les France.
While the traditional model of commemoration has broken down, the Republican paradigm is still quite resilient, albeit under pressure. This will be particularly relevant to my case study on (post)colonial memory, since one of the challenges to the Republican paradigm is precisely (post)coloniality. As Alec Hargreaves points out, discussing ethnicity in the French Republic can be very difficult due to the focus on the individual citizen and general reticence to acknowledge intermediary groups between the State and the citizen. 8 Similarly postcolonial theory has been slow to take hold in France 9 and has only emerged in French in recent years. 10 The old model is clearly under pressure. Its short term focus on forgetting and selective celebration of the Republic has proved inadequate over the last fifty years. This tradition of forgetting and repression-Ernest Renan in his lecture "What is a Nation?" states that forgetting is necessary for a nation 11 -has left many unresolved issues. The legacy of the Franco-Algerian War is one such issue. The Algerian War was amongst other things a "latent civil war;" 12 it pitted French against French-for example, conscripts against putschists in 1961, or porteurs de valise 13 against OAS-as well as Algerians against Algerians. Such divisive histories have long been repressed. The riots throughout many French cities in late 2005 showed the extent to which contemporary socioeconomic exclusion actually functions along ethnic lines in France as well as the sheer scale of the problem. For several weeks pitched battles pitted young people living in the underprivileged outer suburbs (banlieues) of towns and cities against the police. Many of these young people are children or even now grand-children of migrants who came to France after World War Two from the then colonies of France such as Algeria.
14 While such disturbances have been a regular occurrence since the early 1990s in a handful of particularly deprived suburbs such as Vénissieux on the outskirts of Lyon, 2005 was the first time riots of such severity, intensity and duration engulfed towns and cities throughout France. President Chirac may have campaigned in the 1995 Presidential campaign on a platform of combating the "social fracture," however over a decade later these issues have clearly been exacerbated rather than addressed. The trauma and bitterness of the colonial era and its bloody end, while appearing to belong to a far off period, are in reality unresolved as both Benjamin Stora and Kristin Ross have argued. 15 Stora highlights the links between actors in the Algerian War and the French National Front extreme right political party. Ross identifies a powerful narrative or a discourse in France that has portrayed modernization and Empire separately and that makes the Empire appear as "ancient history" rather than as an event that did not end cleanly, and that impacted very directly and centrally on the lives of many people now alive in France. More and more of the work in Francophone (post)colonial studies is highlighting the link between the colonial period and contemporary issues in France, notably around race. 16 Here I want to add to this scholarship through a case study of one (post)colonial "memory battle" around the Algerian War (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) . 17 Through an analysis of various "vectors of memory" the paper argues that the recent upsurge in "memory work" in France is very much anchored in the present (post)colonial social context in France. That memory work is however largely symbolic and in some ways unsatisfactory.
It shows that much of the recent work of memory has been only belatedly and partially undertaken by the State, with civil society in some ways yet to follow.
Recent Work of Memory in France: The Franco-Algerian War
Over forty-five years after the conflict ended, the Algerian War remains highly relevant to an understanding of contemporary French society due to its legacy, which has been difficult to work through and overcome. Yet its significance remains underestimated by many. Millions of people in today's France fought in or lived through the conflict. It lasted nearly eight years and was a fiercely fought campaign that caused huge division in French society. The war engendered the collapse of the Fourth Republic and caused immense rifts in France and Algeria as different communities emerged: such as professional soldiers, conscripts, OAS members (a far-right group of settlers and disgruntled army officers that sought by increasingly desperate, violent, and illegal means to keep Algeria French), 18 gaullists, porteurs de valise (French who supported Algerian nationalists), harkis (Algerians who fought for the French army), and pieds-noirs (settlers). These groups are still very evident in French society today, often having formed associations and communities that tend to be hostile to one another. This gradual shift in the public discourses around the conflict began in September 1997 when Jean-Pierre Masseret, Secretary of State for Veterans, first gave a speech in which he used the term "the Algerian War." 22 The process was in a sense concluded on 10 June 1999, when the French Parliament passed a law making official the use of the term "Algerian War" in legal texts. Jean-Pierre Masseret personally played an essential role in this process and veterans' associations (through lobbying) were important in generating the necessary momentum. Masseret became a member of the Socialist-led government in 1997, which partly explains the timing of these moves but, it is important to note that from the late 1990s the veterans seemed to be wielding more and more influence demographically, socially, and politically. Perhaps this is due to the fact that many veterans were about to or were beginning to take retirement at this point, thus giving them more opportunity to invest time and energy in the activities of veterans' associations. Previous studies have also shown the way in which as people grow older they may want to come to terms with, and transmit, memories that they previously repressed. 23 Distance between the event being remembered and the present may also facilitate remembering.
Changes too have taken place at sites of memory. 24 At the local level, thousands of "rues du 19 mars" (19 March Street) or steles have been created. A prominent veterans association, the FNACA, spearheaded this drive to memorialize using street names, by drawing on its strength, particularly at local level and in relation to local government. 25 At the departmental level, almost every department now has its memorial. At the same time, a national memorial was created at Quai Bondy. It takes the form of three pillars, each with a list of names of victims that continually scrolls. There has also been greater recognition of the events of 17 Harkis (Algerian soldiers who fought in the French army) have also received greater official recognition by the French State in the recent past. The history of the harkis was for many years regarded as one of the most occluded aspects of the Algerian War. 27 They too now have received a site of memory, a plaque in the Invalides in Paris that reads: "The French Republic acknowledges its gratitude to the repatriated members of additional and assimilated forces or victims of captivity in Algeria for the sacrifices that they made." This memorial was inaugurated during the first National Day of Homage to the Harkis on 25 September 2001. Initially a one-off, this is now an annual commemoration. Here too activism has played a key role, as has a change in generation since it is the "sons and daughters of harkis" who have protested most actively. Sons have mounted regular demonstrations since 1974 28 and daughters of harkis have recently used writing very effectively 29 . William Cohen believes political considerations are crucial to understanding this shift in memorialization: "The harkis, believed to be four hundred thousand strong in France, represented a significant electorate that needed wooing, so their cause was also being exploited by political rivals." 30 The last ten years have undoubtedly witnessed a move by the French State and government to acknowledge the Algerian War far more than previously. Part of this shift can be explained by political considerations: the moderate right in particular has been keen to win over elements that might otherwise vote for the National Front. The National Front has traditionally drawn considerable support from former settlers, OAS members and harkis. 31 Another explanation is more personal. Jacques Chirac (President of France, 1995-2007), for example, fought in Algeria. Chirac was twenty-three when he arrived in Algeria to lead thirty-two men between April 1956 and June 1957. He then returned to Algeria between July 1959 and March 1960 as a functionary. While Chirac was for some the "president of the duty of memory," President Nicolas Sarkozy seems intent on ending what he sees as the trend towards "repentance." Chirac personally played a leading role in much State level "work of memory," such as his 1995 recognition that France had committed "l'irréparable" (that which cannot be made up for) during the Vichy years. 32 The Vichy period was very much the affair of the previous President of France, François Mitterrand. The "Algerian generation", on the other hand, was much more directly Jacques Chirac's generation, as it was a war in which he fought. Yet it is not at all clear that the generational change from Chirac to Sarkozy will facilitate French society's examination of its colonial past. It is also far from clear that the civil society has been particularly involved in these moves. My own work has shown the extent of lack of transmission of memories of the war in the three crucial vectors of the education system, the media, and the family. 33 The Algerian War is little taught in schools. The wider subjects of Decolonization and the French Fourth/Fifth Republics are covered, but this leaves little room for the Algerian War itself. In other words, pupils may learn about Empires and their respective ends, but touch little on any specific account of French involvement in Algeria. There is virtually no time to invite veterans to class or to show films on the subject in an education system that is pedagogically very teacher centered. This treatment contrasts strongly with the teaching of the Second World War and the Vichy regime, which amounts to a quarter of the terminale (final year of high school) program. Unfortunately, the school system is unable to present much of the French historiography of the conflict produced since the early 1990s, and consequently the "memory battles" or "selective memories" that circulate in society cannot be engaged by historical knowledge. Few pages of textbooks are devoted to the war in Algeria, nor are many questions set on the topic at the baccalauréat (high school certificate) examination.
Similarly, it is rare for pupils to hear much about the Algerian War from their family. Veterans of the war in particular have been notoriously silent on the topic, for a variety of reasons, which include trauma, the sheer difficulty of confronting the experience and also a lack of interest from French society. All work in this area points to the silences and lack of dialogue in the millions of families affected by the war. 34 This body of work examines a number of different groups that participated in various ways in the Franco-Algerian War-such as harkis, settlers, Algerian workers in France, or veterans. The common thread is a reluctance to talk about the war, particularly with family members.
One exception to this trend of the State-level domination of the re-working the Franco-Algerian War is "work of memory" in the media. This is another area that has proved very polemical. The media in recent years have been at the center of renewed examination of the Algerian War by French society. Throughout 2000 there was considerable media coverage in France on one of the most taboo aspects of the Algerian War: the French army's use of torture. 35 Prior to this, the subject of torture was very rarely evoked and its discussion was limited to periodic eruptions occasioned by the publication in the early 1970s of General Massu's book La Vraie bataille d'Alger (The Real Battle of Algiers); or after the screening in France of Gillo Pontecorvo's film La Bataille d'Alger (The Battle of Algiers); or the discussion in the early 1980s of Jean-Marie Le Pen's activities in Algeria. 36 This wave of media coverage lasted two years and has been described as a "very polemical and mediatized reactivation of the memory of the Algerian war." 37 The coverage began in Le Monde when the paper first published the testimony of Louisette Ighilahriz. Ighilahriz described how she had been tortured by French forces and alleged that high ranking French army officers had been present, specifically Generals Jacques Massu and Marcel Bigeard-the former headed the Tenth Division of the French Paratroopers during the Battle of Algiers in 1957. In response to these allegations, Massu and Bigeard also published their own accounts in the paper, and over time other officers such as Generals Maurice Schmitt and Paul Aussaresses-the latter published the book Services Spéciaux: Algérie 1955-57 (Special Services: Algeria 1955-57) in 2001-were also accused of human rights violations. 38 Judging by readers' letters, the coverage of the topic was polemical rather than reconciliatory.
Discussion of the Algerian War is still very difficult, particularly at a personal level. It is therefore to be expected that the State-level work of memory, first of all encouraged by the most active elements of civil society (early memory activists), and now followed by a broader section of civil society (film makers), will take time to impact on individuals and groups affected by the Algerian War.
Conclusion
Social memories of the Franco-Algerian War in France were for many years profoundly repressed and occluded, reflecting the immense trauma, shame and bitterness of a painful defeat. Individuals who participated in the Algerian War struggled to articulate what they had endured, people close to them often did not want to discuss those events, and the French government encouraged silence on the topic for the sake of national unity. However, over time, slowly but surely, such memories have evolved and emerged. What were once resolutely private memories have slowly entered the public sphere, often periodically around key commemorations (thirtieth and fortieth anniversaries of the end of the war in 1992 and 2002 respectively) and after a period of two or three decades as the participants have aged and retired and their children or grandchildren have grown up. The tireless work of "memory activists," from writers and scholars to political activists and filmmakers, has since the 1960s helped to shape a more clearly visible set of social memories. An acceleration in this process has occurred in France since the late 1990s, with a key shift in the stance of the French government and State, that had played such a key role previously in occluding memories of the war, and a number of explanations have been offered for these developments.
Given the variety of ways in which memories of Algeria have emerged, and the complex picture of repression and occlusion followed by progressive development of social memories, a number of theories of social memories need to be referred to in order to understand these patterns. These should reference the work of Maurice Halbwachs with his focus on the social frames of memory and the present social construction of memories. More psychological accounts of memory can shed light on the repression of memories. The passage of generations, both political (from Presidents Mitterrand to Chirac) and personal (from first generation migrants to their sons and daughters or grandchildren), helps explain how previously repressed events have slowly been uncovered. Lastly, the breadth of ways in which memories have been articulated in recent decades can be understood by reference to plural models of social memory that emphasize the role of individuals and groups in activating memories, such as that defended by Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan.
There has clearly been an important shift in social memories of the Algerian War in France over the last ten years. However, upon closer inspection, we can note that social memories of the Algerian War still clearly concern groups. In 1990 Jean-Pierre Rioux pointed to the lack of any national memory of the Algerian War, and highlighted the number of group memories that existed. Benjamin Stora too has identified what he calls "cloistered memories." Although the French State has acknowledged the plight of various groups in recent years, it has done so group by group. At present, the broader frames of memory that could move across groups, such as the education system, are not able to provide a forum for cross-group discussion. Although, as Stora has pointed out, "recognition" is a step forward from "knowledge" of what took place, 39 we might also hope in coming years that discussion of France's role in Algeria becomes enlarged and more sustained and allows the various groups involved in the Algerian War to reconsider each other. There is a division between traditional Republican approaches to memory and more postcolonial challenges to this, 40 in so far as the traditional Republican model fears what Pierre Nora has termed a balkanization of memory and emphasizes the need for unity whereas memory activists like Yamina Benguigui, Mehdi Charef and Philippe Bernard believe that working through memories of the Algerian War is essential to the process of integration of ethnic minorities. The French State has now been able to integrate certain groups (such as soldiers and settlers) more centrally into the National narrative, and it remains to be seen if, to what extent, and how that inclusion will be extended to other groups and consolidated or developed in future years. 3. There has also been some "memory work" regarding the French war in Indo-China. See for example Nikki Cooper, "Dien Bien Phu-Fifty Years On, Modern and Contemporary France 12 (4):445. As Nikki Cooper argues, the conflict has little resonance in contemporary France. One explanation for this is that it was only professional soldiers who fought in Indo-China (whereas soldiers were drafted to Algeria) and another is the fact that Indo-China was not settled to the same degree as Algeria. See Philip Dine, Images of the Algerian War: French Fiction and Film, (Oxford, 1994) for a full discussion of these points.
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4. It is noteworthy that the outer regions of France, furthest from the Parisian centre, tend to have the strongest regional identities-and most active regionalist movements, such as in Brittany (North West) or Corsica (Mediterranean).
5. French history has usually been characterized by division, see Michel Winock's aptly entitled La Fièvre hexagonale (Hexagonal [French] Fever). This attention to discord can also be found in the concept of "guerres franco-françaises" (quasi civil wars) e.g. the Dreyfus Affair (1890s). However, World War One revealed a surprising consensus as previously belligerent parties (Left and Right, trade unions, religious groups, Republicans and monarchists) came together to defend the nation, hence the term "Sacred Union."
